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I. INTRODUCTION
Parties to modem form contracts sometimes interact with one
another in the same way a parent of an autistic child interacts with
that child. When a licensor offers a software license with the
assertion that it will infer acceptance of all the license terms if the
licensee removes the power cord from its plastic wrapper, the
licensor is drawing an inference from the licensee's behavior just as
doubtful as the inference a hopeful parent draws from an autistic
child's apparently knowing response to the parent's statement.
In this paper I address the question whether the law should
affirm the offeror's inference and should bind the offeree to the
lRobert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
I thank Katharine R. Saunders, University of Michigan '99, for her research
assistance and Omri Ben Shahar, Nathan Crystal, John E. Lopatka, and Marie
T. Reilly for their helpful suggestions.
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terms proposed by the offeror even in circumstances where the
offeree may not intend to accept those terms and where an
objective observer might not draw the inference of agreement from
the offeree's act. Modem practice and current proposals concerning
contract formation in Revised Article 2 and in the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act (nee Article 2B) press
these issues on us more forcefully than old practices and different
law did.1  But contractual autism is not new; it is a
1. The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) may be
found at the University of Pennsylvania Law School web page. (visited Jan. 15,
2000) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/citaam99.pdf>. The relevant
language for the purposes of this Article is in proposed section 112: Manifesting
Assent; Opportunity to Review, 1999 Annual Meeting Draft, which reads:
(a) A person manifests assent to a record or term if the person,
acting with knowledge of, or after having an opportunity to review the
record or term or a copy of it:
(1) authenticates the record or term to adopt or accept it;
(2) intentionally engages in conduct or makes statements with
reason to know that the other party or its electronic agent may infer
from the conduct or statement that the person assents to the record or
term.
(b) An electronic agent manifests assent to a record or term if, after
having an opportunity to review, the electronic agent:
(1) authenticates the record; or
(2) engages in operations that the circumstances clearly indicate
constitute acceptance.
(c) If this [Act] or other law requires assent to a specific term, a
manifestation of assent must relate specifically to the term.
(d) Conduct or operations manifesting assent may be proved in any
manner, including a showing that a procedure existed by which a
person or an electronic agent must have engaged in the conduct or
operations in order to obtain, or to proceed with use of the information
or informational rights. Proof of assent depends on the circumstances.
Proof of compliance with subsection (a)(2) is sufficient if there is
conduct that assents and subsequent conduct that electronically
reaffirms assent.
UCITA 5 112(a)-(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1999).
The effect of the last sentence in (d) is unclear. Subsection (d) is best read as
an evidentiary section. Thus, this sentence could be interpreted to read that one
way a litigant may prove the other party assented to a contract is by showing
1694
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that the other party engaged in some conduct from which the first party inferred
assent when the other reaffirmed the assent electronically. This seems redundant:
surely few will question the existence of a contract when the offeree accepts in
two different methods. Additionally, the first two sentences seem to show that
proof of assenting conduct may depend on the facts of the case and may be
proved in any manner; it hardly seems coherent for the drafters to then specify
one method of proof. I therefore assume that this is one possible way of proving
assent under section (a) (2) and that this kind of double proof is sufficient, but not
necessary.
Section (a)(2) by its plain language also changes the law. Prior to this, the
standard for judging assent was "objective manifestation of assent."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §19 (1981). This standard is widely
and commonly adopted. Seeinfra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. Yet section
(a)(2) replaces the objective manifestation of assent standard. conduct that the
offeree has "reason to know that the other party or its electronic agent may infer
from the conduct or statement that the person assents to the record or term."
UCITA S 112(a)(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1999). The distinction is subtle, yet
critical. It substitutes the offeror's belief as to assenting conduct for an objective
opinion of assenting conduct.
Proposals for revisions of UCC Article 2 are more protective of the offeree,
at least where the offeree is a buyer. See U.C.C. §2-207, 1999 Annual Meeting
Draft, which reads in part:
(b) If a contract is formed by offer and acceptance and the
acceptance is by a record containing terms additional to or different
from the offer or, if the conduct of the parties recognizes the existence
of a contract but the records of the parties do not otherwise establish a
contract, the terms of the contract include:
(1) terms in the records of the parties to the extent that they agree;
(2) nonstandard terms, whether or not in a record, to which the
parties have otherwise agreed,
(3) standard terms in a record supplied by a party to which the
other party has expressly agreed; and
(4) terms supplied or incorporated under any provision of [the
Uniform Commercial Code].
(c) If a party confirms a contract by a record received by the other
party which contains terms that add to or differ from those in the
confirmed contract, the terms of the contract include:
(1) terms in the confirmation and the confirmed contract, to the
extent that they agree;
(2) terms in the confirmed contract to which the parties have
previously agreed,
(3) standard terms in a confirming record that add to or differ from
2000] 1695
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the confirmed contract to which the other party expressly agrees; and
(4) terms supplied or incorporated under any provision of this
article.
(d) In this section, a party does not expressly agree to a term by the
mere retention or use of goods.
U.C.C. § 2-207(b)-(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1999).
Particularly of note is the controversy surrounding a proposed change in
subsection (d) suggested in the February 1, 1999 draft. This change would have
inserted the following section as a new subsection (d), and renumbered the
current subsection (d) as subsection (e). It read-
(d) If a contract for sale is formed in any manner and thereafter the
seller in a record proposes terms to the buyer that vary [add to or differ
from] terms previously agreed, the following rules apply:
(1) If the seller could have disclosed the varying terms to the buyer
in a commercially reasonable manner at the time of contract formation
and failed to do so, the terms do not become part of the contract unless
expressly agreed to by the buyer;
(2) If the seller could not have disclosed the varying terms to the
buyer in a commercially reasonable manner, the seller shall by
conspicuous language in a record notify the buyer at the time of
contract formation that additional or different terms will be proposed.
(A) If the seller gives conspicuous notice, the buyer may either
accept the proposed terms by any method reasonable under the
circumstances or reject the proposed terms and return the goods.
(B) If the seller fails to give conspicuous notice, the proposed terms
do not become part of the contract unless expressly agreed to by the
buyer.
(3) Upon returning goods to the seller, the buyer has a right to:
(A) a refund, and
(B) reimbursement of any reasonable expenses incurred related to
the return and in compliance with any instructions of the seller for
return or, in the absence of instructions, return postage or similar
reasonable expenses in returning the goods.
U.C.C. § 2-207(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1999).
This subsection was removed from the proposed draft following complaint
from Gateway Computers that it would complicate contractual interaction and
increase the costs of contracting. See, e.g., letters from contract professors
criticizing and seeking rejection of the concepts embodied by section 2-207(d):
letter from Douglas G. Baird, Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor
of Law, The University of Chicago, The Law School, to Lawrence J. Bugge,
Chairman, Article 2 Drafting Committee (Mar. 9, 1999); letter from Alan
Schwartz, Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School, to Lawrence J. Bugge,
1696
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familiar part of the law on silence as acceptance, on contract
formation and interpretation under section 2-207 of the UCC, and
on various other forms of non-verbal acceptance.
I. TBE PAST
The history of Anglo-American contract law is a model of the
progressive evolution of contracting behavior.2 The classical model,
one that is still practiced and is often held as the contracting
prototype, is an interactive face-to-face exchange between an offeror
Chairman, UCC Article 2 Drafting Committee (Mar. 8, 1999); letter from Hal
Scott, Nomura Professor of International Financial Systems, Harvard Law
School, to Lawrence J. Bugge, Chairman, Article 2 Drafting Committee (Mar.
10, 1999). The section was placed in the comments to section 2-207 as Comment
5, intended as historical background, but was withdrawn following continued
controversy. See letter from Lawrence J. Bugge, Chairman, Article 2 Drafting
Committee, Dick Speidel, Reporter, and Linda Rusch, Associate Reporter to
Members of The American Law Institute (May 10, 1999).
The interesting effect of this controversy may be that Gateway and similar
situated companies are in a worse position without the offending section than
they would have been had it remained in the text of section 2-207. With
proposed subsection (d) intact, a company that wished to include new terms in
a confirmation letter or with shipment of goods had a decent opportunity to
have those terms incorporated if it disclosed that it would be proposing those
terms, or made the terms available at the time of contracting. Thus, these
companies would have to change their sales representatives' script to include
either of these, but they would have a good chance at having them incorporated.
Without subsection (d), unless a company can (1) get their customers expressly
to agree to these additional terms (and note under the final subsection that
retention of the goods does not connote express agreement), or (2) escape 2-207
entirely by keeping the contract from being formed, they are only conflicting
terms in a confirmation under subsection (c), and do not become part of the
agreement. Although Gateway's own General Counsel has deemed the proposed
section "unnecessary," seeletter of William M. Elliott (Mar. 9, 1999), I am unsure
of the merits of this conclusion.
2. The written history of Anglo-American contract law can surely be traced
at least to yearbooks dating from the 1280's, though it is certain that "since time
immemorial, people have made contracts." John D. Wladis, Common Law and
Uncommon Events: The Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of
Performance in English Contract Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1575, 1575 (1987).
2000] 1697
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and an offeree in which the parties respond to one another's oral
offers, counteroffers, and acceptances. The advent of reliable means
of communicating with a person at a distance, the English mail
system, allowed an interactive exchange by persons who were not
in one another's presence Written exchange raised the possibility
that the parties would communicate serially (and their
communications might cross in the mail), but otherwise the mail
was merely a new verbal method of contracting that took more
time than an oral exchange because of the need to transport the
writings between the offeror and the offeree. The invention of the
telephone brought interactive oral exchange between parties not in
one another's presence.
All three of these exchanges-face-to-face, interactive writing,
and by telephone-share certain characteristics. The model
contemplates an offeror stating his price and conditions and the
offeree responding by accepting or rejecting that price and those
conditions or by making a counteroffer. The original offeror might
then accept the counteroffer or make yet another and different
counteroffer. All three models share the expectation that: (1) each
party would respond to the other's proposal until an agreement was
reached or the parties broke off their negotiations without any
agreement and, (2) the interactive parties will use verbal symbols to
show agreement or disagreement.
Even in the earliest times, certain non-interactive and non
verbal contracts must have co-existed with the interactive models.
For example, the King or powerful landowners must have offered
grain or other things for sale at prices and on terms that were not
negotiable. Presumably the earliest of these transactions were oral
and to be executed at once. More recently these contracts have
found their way into writing and have taken on executory qualities.
Then, as now, these are "take-it or leave-it" deals in which the
3. According to the Chairman of the British Post Office and Royal Mail,
Neville Bain, the Post Office has been active for more than 350 years. See Neville
Bain, Chairman's Statement (visited Jan. 15, 2000)
< http://www.postoffice.co.uk/anreport/chairman.html >.
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offeree's option is to accept the offer or to make no contract.4
Absent fraud or unconscionability, the law has always honored the
contract that results from the offeree's conscious acceptance of the
offer, even in circumstances where the offeree had no power to
modify the offer and when there was no prospect that the offeror
would consider or accept a counteroffer.' This rule is now
embodied in section 211 of the Restatement. 6 Here, of course, the
offeree's acceptance may be grudging but it is conscious and
unequivocal. By signing the offeror's form, the offeree signals his
conscious surrender to the offeror.
4. "Take it or leave it contracts" appear in nineteenth century case law. See
Greer, Mills & Co. v. Stoller, 77 F. 1, 7-8 (W.D. Mo. 1896) ("[Tlhose who are
parties to the bargain must take it or leave it as a whole." (quoting Mogul S.S.
Co. v. McGregor, Gow, & Co., 21 Q.B. Div'l Ct. 544, 552 (1888) (Coleridge,
CJ.))).
5. See, e.g., Merit Music Serv., Inc. v. Sonneborn, 225 A.2d 470, 474 (Md.
1967) ("[The law presumes that a person knows the contents of a document he
executes and understands at least the literal meaning of its terms."). The common
acceptance of standardized contracts also demonstrates that contracts which the
offeree has no power to modify are generally honored. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS S 211 (1981) (comments explain the
merits and necessity of standardized contracts); 5 ARTHuR LINTON CORBIN &
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.21 (rev'd ed. 1998); Avery
Katz, The Strategic Structure ofOfferandAcceptance: Game Theory and the Law of
Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215 (1990); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629
(1943).
6. Section 211 of the Restatement reads in full:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement
signs or otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to believe
that like writings are regularly used to embody terms of agreements of
the same type, he adopts the writing as an integrated agreement with
respect to the terms included in the writing.
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating
alike all those similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or
understanding of the standard terms of the writing.
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party
manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing
contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981).
20001 1699
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Coexisting with these verbal and interactive contracts are many
others where the behavior of one or both of the parties is more
autistic. I characterize behavior as "autistic" either because it is non-
verbal and subject to differing interpretations or, when verbal, is
not directly responsive to what has come before. The law has
explicitly addressed at least four sets of cases. First are cases where
a person, such as a credit card issuer, has periodic interaction with
its customer and where it purports to find acceptance of a proposed
modification by the offeree's continued performance after notice of
the proposed change. Second is the provision of unrequested
merchandise, i.e., the magazine subscription or book which is sent
to one who did not order it but who is claimed to have agreed to
buy it by using it. Third are the "silence as acceptance" cases where
the courts sometimes conclude that a party has accepted an offer
even though he has not made any identifiable response to it. Finally
are the cases under section 2-207 of the UCC where the law often
finds a contract despite the parties' assertions in their forms that no
contract exists unless the other party agrees to all of the offeror's or
counterofferor's terms.
Consider first, modifications of continuing contracts that call
for repeated performance by the parties. The initial contract
between a credit card issuer and a credit card holder typically
provides that the credit card company has the right to modify the
contract and that the cardholder's use of the card after reasonable
notice of the modification is to be construed as acceptance of that
modification.7 Bank deposit contracts and other repeat transaction
agreements share these qualities. The courts almost always conclude
that the consumer is bound to the proposed modification if he uses
7. Generally, courts uphold these modifications because the consumer in the
original contract agreed to permit the bank to make such modifications upon
appropriate notice. See, e.g., Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 596 F.2d 188
(7th Cir. 1979); Stiles v. Home Cable Concepts, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1410 (M.D.
Ala. 1998); Perry v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 1998 WL 279174 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 1998);
Grasso v. First USA Bank, 713 A.2d 304 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998); Garberv. Harris
Trust & Sav. Bank, 432 N.E.2d 1309 (IIl. App. Ct. 1982).
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the credit card after reasonable notice of the modification.8 Most of
these cases emphasize the fact that the original contract between the
offeror and offeree explicitly provides for these modifications.
Other practical aspects of these transactions certainly incline the
courts to bless the modifications. For example, many credit card
holders have multiple cards and, upon notice, are always free to use
the other cards and so reject the modification.9 And for most credit
card holders it is a small cost to drop one card and find another; the
investment in a particular credit card is often quite modest.1°
Avoidance of the disproportionate transaction costs (individual
verbal affirmations by millions of cardholders) that would
otherwise be imposed on the system for very modest benefit is
another practical reason for recognizing modifications by use.
In the second set of cases the law draws the conclusion of no
contract from the offeree's autistic behavior. Assume a book
publisher sends a book unsolicited to a consumer together with a
statement that unless the consumer returns the book or takes some
other action to cancel, the consumer's use of the book will be
considered an acceptance of an offer to buy. Forty-five states in the
United States have passed statutes which provide that furnishing
unordered merchandise to a prospective buyer is a gift. This means,
of course, that the prospective buyer can keep the book, read it and
suffer no liability to the publisher. Here the law not only declines
to draw the inference of acceptance (which the common law would
have drawn prior to the adoption of these statutes),1 but it
8. But see Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998) (holding addition of an alternative dispute resolution clause not permitted).
9. See Damon Cline, Consumers Latch on to Credit Card Deals, THE
AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Nov. 2, 1998 (discussing strategies for switching credit
cards); Thomas G. Donlan, Just Charge It: There-s Already a Competitive Market
in Credit, BARRON'S, Nov. 23, 1998 (stating that the credit card market is
competitive enough to benefit the average consumer).
10. See Donlan, supra note 9. But see Henry Gilgoff, It's Your Money,
NEWSDAY, Feb. 7,1999 (discussing new hidden fees for balance transfers between
cards and increased late fees in 1999).
11. See Prestype, Inc. v. Carr, 248 N.W.2d 111, 120-21 (Iowa 1976) (stating
that offeree who had reasonable opportunity to reject unordered goods but
2000] 1701
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explicitly commands the opposite inference, namely that there is no
acceptance. This case is easy to distinguish from the credit card
transaction. By hypothesis, the consumer in this case never ordered
the goods and never had a pre-existing contract. But do not forget,
at common law the failure to order was not sufficient to free a user
from restitution and, possibly, contract liability.
Silence as acceptance (or not) is a staple of first year contracts
classes; here the insurance company offers a renewal and the
insured-who later claims a contract-is silent or the insured applies
for a renewal and the insurance company fails to respond.
12
Another possibility is the seller who offers goods and the silent
buyer, who could be expected to respond if he does not want them,
is bound. 3 Yet silence is usually not acceptance. 4 Except in the
instead took the benefit of them was bound to pay the contract price); see also 2
SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 6:49 (4th ed. 1991) (stating that if the offeree uses or otherwise
takes the benefit of unordered goods, he will be bound to the offeror's price).
12. Insurance companies are bound by the terms of the policy applied for
when the insurance company fails to respond to the insured's application within
a reasonable time. See, e.g., Huberman v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 492
So.2d 416, 417 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that "an insurance company
obtaining an application for insurance is under a duty to accept it or to reject it
within a reasonable time, and is liable if it delays unreasonably in acting
thereon." (quoting 12A JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 7217 (1981))); Lechler v. Montana Life Ins. Co.
of Helena, 186 N.W. 271 (N.D. 1921) (holding that an insurance company was
liable for the payment of a policy when it led a policy holder to believe that if
he conformed to certain requirements his policy would be reinstated, and who
then complied with those requirements, and the company did not notify him
that his application was rejected). In these cases, the applicant relies on the
prospect of getting insurance from one company by not pursuing alternative
applications with other companies. The insurance cases tend to require reliance
by the applicant on his application and where he has shown that he would have
sought insurance coverage elsewhere had he known the first company would
delay unreasonably. See also Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient
Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481, 525 (1996) (arguing that these cases rest on
reliance by the offeror on the offeree's silence).
13. These cases rest on an ongoing relationship or an established course of
dealing which indicated that the offeror was justified in expecting a reply if the
1702
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unusual cases, the burden is on the offeror to prod the offeree to
action; generally, the law requires the offeror to get at least a grunt
of approval from the offeree.
The most elaborate response to autistic contracts is section 2-207
of the Uniform Commercial Code."5 By separating the question
whether a contract has been formed from the question what are the
offer was not accepted. See, e.g., Adams v. Johns-Manville Corp., 876 F.2d 702,
706 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that "[gliven the parties' previous course of dealings,"
silence constituted acceptance where an objection to the offer of settlement was
not communicated to the offeror); Brooks Towers Corp. v. Hunkin-Conkey
Constr. Co., 454 F.2d 1203, 1207 (10th Cir. 1972) (stating that silence will
operate as acceptance where "the relations between the parties justify the
offeror's expectation of a reply or where a duty exists to communicate...
rejection"); Laredo Nat'l Bank v. Gordon, 61 F.2d 906, 907 (5th Cir. 1932)
(holding that "where the relation between the parties is such that the offeror is
justified in expecting a reply, or the offeree is under a duty to reply, the latter's
silence will be regarded as acceptance"). See also Craswell, supra note 12, at 526.
14. See 2 WILusTON & LORD, supra note 11, §§ 6:49-6:50; 1 CORBIN &
PERILLO, supra note 5, SS 3.18-3.21; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
569 cmt. a (1981).
15. Section 2-207 reads in full:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from
those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for
addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of
the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a
contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the
writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such
cases the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on
which the writings of the parties -agree, together with any
supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this
Act.
U.C.C. S 2-207 (1989).
20001 1703
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terms of that contract, section 2-207 attempts to make sense of
certain autistic behavior by the parties. For the first time it
recognizes the possibility that a response which conflicts in some
significant way with the offer can nevertheless be an acceptance-so
making a contract. 16 Sections 2-207(2) and (3) then answer a
different question: what are the terms of the contract that has been
formed?17 Unlike the common law which interpreted performance
in the face of an unequivocal offer to be an agreement to all of the
terms in the offer, section 2-207 often finds performance together
with the sending of a responsive document or telephone call to
make a contract that includes terms from both forms together with
default terms from Article 2 of the UCC."8
16. SeeIdaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 596 F.2d 924,926 (9th
Cir. 1979) (stating that section 2-207 rejects the common law rule that an
acceptance must be the mirror image of the offer); Tecumseh Int'l Corp. v. City
of Springfield, 388 N.E.2d 460, 463 (IMI. App. Ct. 1979) (noting that many
common law counteroffers are acceptances under section 2-207); Gardner Zemke
Co. v. Dunham Bush, Inc., 850 P.2d 319, 322 (N.M. 1993) (noting that drafters
of section 2-207 intended to change common law mirror image rule).
17. Commentators may disagree about the application of section 2-207,
particularly in cases where there are additional or different terms found in both
an offer and an acceptance. See, e.g., JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 10-12 (4th ed. 1995) (disagreement between Bob
and me concerning whether different terms in an acceptance cancel each other
out (my view) or whether different terms in an acceptance fall out and the
contract is governed by the terms of the offer (Bob's view)). In one of the few
arguments I have ever won with Bob, the majority of cases have upheld my
position. See Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1578-79 (10th Cir.
1984) (containing an overview of the case law on the issue).
18. While the default filling terms of Article 2 will control in the event that
conflicting terms drop out or the parties did not negotiate some term, the gap-
fillers are not properly used to knock out a contrary term in the offer. See Idaho
Power, 596 F.2d at 927 (upholding an offeror's clause limiting liability against
offeree's claim that its silent acceptance included full consequential damages
under the Code's default rules). If the writings of the parties do not otherwise
establish a contract, but their conduct evidences a contract, section 2-207(3)
applies. See Challenge Mach. Co. v. Mattison Mach. Works, 359 N.W.2d 232,236
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (holding section 2-207(3) only applies if there is no
contract under section 2-207(1) but conduct of parties indicates a contract exists).
1704
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As interpreted by American courts over the last 40 years,
section 2-207 weakens the power of the offeror to control the terms
of the agreement. By giving the offeree some of its terms under
section 2-207(2) and depriving the offeror of many of its terms
under cases that wind up in section 2-207(3), the law weakens the
inference of acceptance traditionally drawn from the offeree's
autistic behavior.
To find a contract after a mindless exchange of printed forms
and to construct it from fragments of printed forms and code parts,
is probably consistent with the expectations of the parties in the
transactions under section 2-207. The parties' behavior tells one that
the transaction.cost of negotiating each of these deals outweighs the
cost of an occasional bad warranty or an ineffective disclaimer. By
their behavior-behavior that is often well informed by clever
lawyers-the parties are saying that on balance and in gross they
would rather have contracts, even contracts with some unfavorable
terms, than to have no contracts or only fully negotiated ones.19 If
one assumes that hundreds or thousands of contracts are performed
with no significant dispute, for every contract where there is a
dispute large enough to get a lawyer involved, this behavior is
sensible-at least if the costs of negotiation are more than trivial (as
they surely are) and if the injuries from the occasional dispute that
could have been avoided by a negotiated term are modest (as they
usually would be). Thus, the courts' interpretation and application
In section 2-207(3) cases, the parties must have had some written
communication, but assuming such communication exists, the parties' contract
is governed by the relevant provisions of Article 2 rather than the terms of any
one document. See McJunkin Corp. v. Mechanicals, Inc., 888 F.2d 481, 489 (6th
Cir. 1989) (stating that section 2-207(3) contract is supplemented by remedy
provision of the Code); C. Itoh & Co. (America) Inc. v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552
F.2d 1228, 1237 (7th Cir. 1977); Leonard Pevar Co. v. Evans Prod. Co., 524 F.
Supp. 546, 552 (D. Del. 1981) (stating that under section 2-207(3) the Code gap-
fillers supply terms where writings of parties do not agree).
19. See John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the Battle of the Forms': Solutions,
39 VAN). L. REV. 1307, 1312-15 (1986) (discussing reliance on printed forms
between merchants and the ability of parties to rely on the UCC's default
standards when they do not negotiate their own).
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of section 2-207 is probably consistent with the parties' expectation.
Ill. THE FUTURE
Relying on this history of Anglo American Law, how should
the law address the modem autistic contract exemplified by the
license for computer software or the sale of certain goods through
a distributor to an end user? Assume that Microsoft packages
Windows '98 with a computer that is sold to a consumer by
Gateway. The consumer orders from Gateway by phone and
authorizes payment by giving her credit card number. Some of the
money paid to Gateway goes indirectly to Microsoft as payment for
the software, but unless Gateway is considered to be Microsoft's
agent, the consumer never deals with Microsoft. 0 When the
computer arrives, the software is installed, and the power cord has
a statement on it: "by opening the plastic to get at this power cord
you agree to be bound by the terms of the Windows '98 license."
There are, of course, many variations on this theme but all have in
common (1) no interaction with the licensor at the time of
supposed acceptance, (2) payment before supposed acceptance and
with limited knowledge of the terms of the offer and, (3)
attribution by the offeror of some meaning to the autistic behavior
of the user (opening, installing, privately clicking "I agree."). 21
20. Gateway's telephone operators deny that they are agents of Microsoft.
However, this may not be a realistic assessment of the relationship between
Gateway and Microsoft, since we cannot expect that Gateway's sales staff are
fully cognizant of the legal ramifications of the transactions between the two
corporations. Telephone Interview by Katharine Saunders with Gateway sales
agent (Feb. 16, 1999).
21. In two cases, the Seventh Circuit upheld this kind of contract against
consumers who used the software. In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447,
1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996), the Seventh Circuit held that a shrink-wrap license
contained in software was binding on a buyer under the Uniform Commercial
Code. The plaintiff, ProCD, Inc., had "compiled information from ... telephone
directories into a computer database." Id. at 1449. This database was sold for two
different prices: a cheaper one for consumer use, and a more expensive price for
manufacturers and retailers. See id. ProCD included with the software a license
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which permitted certain uses, depending on who the buyer was. See id. at 1450.
Defendant Zeidenberg purchased the computer database software at a retail
outlet (at the consumer price) and subsequently formed a company to resell the
information on the Internet for less than ProCD's commercial price. See id.
ProCD sued on violation of its license.
The court determined that the restrictions on purchasers' use of the software
were ordinary contracts. "[W]e treat the licenses as ordinary contracts
accompanying the sale of products, and therefore as governed by the common
law of contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code." Id. The court reasoned
that because it is impractical for vendors to put "the entire terms of a contract
on the outside of a box," a notice on the outside of a box that the software
purchase is subject to the terms listed inside coupled with the "right to return the
software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable... may be a means of doing
business valuable to buyers and sellers alike." Id at 1451.
The court first looked at other areas of the law where strict offer and
acceptance machinery are not used. Citing insurance cases and entertainment
tickets as two examples, the court acknowledged that there are many permissible
transactions where "the exchange of money precedes the communication of
detailed terms" of the agreement. See id. Because the nature of most software
transactions is not to take place over the counter, but by phone or over the
Internet, the industry relies on making a contract in which some of the terms are
not specifically agreed to. See id
The court applied Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to the
software sale. Although the defendants argued that Article 2 does not cover
shrink-wrap contracts because what was then proposed Article 2B had a specific
section which would validate standard form end user licenses, the court refuted
this. "To propose a change in a law's text is not necessarily to propose a change
in the law's effect. New words may be designed to fortify the current rule with
a more precise text that curtails uncertainty." Id. at 1452. In applying the current
UCC, the court cited section 2-204(1), saying "[a] contract for sale of goods may
be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both
parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract." Id (quoting U.C.C.
§ 2-204(1) (1989)). The Seventh Circuit reasoned that "[a] vendor, as master of the
offer, may invite acceptance by conduct, and may propose limitations on the
kind of conduct that constitutes acceptance, [and that] a buyer may accept by
performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat as acceptance." Id The court
concluded that a valid contract was created in this case when "ProCD proposed
a contract that a buyer would accept by using the software after having an
opportunity to read the license at leisure," and when the defendant Zeidenberg
did so. See id
In Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), the Seventh
Circuit held that terms sent in a computer box to a buyer who ordered the
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None of the cases described above fits this transaction precisely.
It is not like the credit card transaction because there is no prior
agreement between Microsoft and the consumer on which a
computer over the phone were binding on the buyer and governed the sale
unless the buyer returned the computer within thirty days. Rich and Enza Hill
purchased their computer from Gateway over the phone. There is no claim that
all of the terms were read to the Hills during their ordering phone call. The
computer arrived with several additional terms listed on forms inside the boxes.
One of these was an agreement to arbitrate disputes with the company. The Hills
"kept the computer [for] more than thirty days before complaining about its
components and performance." Id. at 1148. "Gateway asked the district court
judge to enforce the arbitration clause [but] the judge refused," holding that the
agreement was unenforceable. See id. Gateway appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
Judge Easterbrook, the same judge who wrote the opinion in ProCD, wrote the
opinion of the court.
The court's opinion begins by citing ProCD as controlling because it relied
on the Uniform Commercial Code, rather than any one state's law. See id. at
1149. Interpreting ProCD as holding "that terms inside a box of software bind
consumers who use the software after an opportunity to read the terms and to
reject them by returning the product," the court held that ProCD applies to
commercial transactions where payment occurs for a product "with terms to
follow." Id at 1148. The court reasoned that because "Gateway shipped
computers with the same sort of accept-or-return offer ProCD made to users of
its software," the holding of ProCD applies. See id at 1149. The court stated that
"ProCD is about the law of contract, not the law of software," and noted that it
should not be limited to software transactions. See id Citing no case law, the
court reasoned that it would be impractical to require vendors to disclose the full
legal terms to consumers prior to receiving payment. See id The court referenced
air transportation and insurance as areas of the law where it is common for
payment to precede "the revelation of full terms." Id The court stated that both
customers and vendors are better off with the current "approve-or-return
device," and that in any case, since the box the Hills received "from Gateway was
crammed with software," ProCD would still apply to this case. See id
Next, the court determined that ProCD is not limited to executory contracts
or licenses, but rather concerns the question of contract formation. See id. at
1149-50. The court stated that "[t]he question in ProCD was not whether terms
were added to a contract after its formation, but how and when the contract was
formed." Id at 1150. Without rigorously analyzing the case specifics, the court
concluded that the Hills accepted Gateway's offer by "keeping the computer
beyond thirty days." Id
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modification could be rested. It is not exactly like the unordered
book because the consumer may have known about the software,
or even if he did not, surely intended to buy and pay for the
hardware. It is not the same as the usual section 2-207 case because
the buyer is unlikely to send a responsive document, thus there will
be no direct written competition t'o Microsoft's form license. It is
similar to the cases where an offeror construes silence to be
acceptance, but not exactly the same, for by hypothesis, the licensee
rips open the plastic to get at the power cord, loads and uses the
software and perhaps does a private, ritualistic "I agree." It is also,
of course, unlike the case in which the King sells grain at the King's
own price to his subjects, for the subject consciously, albeit
reluctantly, agrees to the King's terms.
It may be important to note that the cases in my models are not
all alike. The silence by acceptance cases usually address the
question whether a contract exists at all.' For example, the insured
who fails to respond to the insurance company's offer of insurance
22. See, e.g., Adams v. Johns-Manville Corp., 876 F.2d 702, 706 (9th Cir.
1989) (stating that "[gliven the parties' previous course of dealings," silence
constituted acceptance where an objection to the offer of settlement was not
communicated to the offeror); Brooks Towers Corp. v. Hunkin-Conkey Constr.
Co., 454 F.2d 1203, 1207 (10th Cir. 1972) (stating that silence will operate as
acceptance where "the relations between the parties justify the offeror's
expectation of a reply or where a duty exists to communicate... rejection");
Laredo Nat'l Bank v. Gordon, 61 F.2d 906, 907 (5th Cir. 1932) (holding that
"where the relation between the parties is such that the offeror is justified in
expecting a reply, or the offeree is under a duty to reply, the latter's silence will
be regarded as acceptance"); Prestype, Inc. v. Carr, 248 N.W.2d 111, 120-21 (Iowa
1976) (citing the Restatement and holding that a party's conduct subsequent to
his receipt of merchandise amounted to a confirmation or adoption of the
contract offered because the party failed to reject the merchandise or complain
of any discrepancy); Agri Careers, Inc. v. Jepsen, 463 N.W.2d 93, 96 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1990) (citing language similar to the Restatement, and holding that an
employer who hired and retained a candidate referred by an employment agency
was required to pay the agency's fee because the employer had taken the benefit
of the employment agency's services); Moore v. Kuehn, 602 S.W.2d 713, 718
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that a party's "silent acquiescence in and
acceptance of ... repair work listed in [a written] proposal constituted an
acceptance of the contract as it related to those items").
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on the same terms as the prior year, will be confronted with the
insurance company's argument that no contract was formed for the
new year. The dispute between the insurance company and the
insured will be over the most important and central obligation in
the contract, namely the obligation of the insurance company to
pay. The cases under section 2-207 and those involving credit cards
are different. In almost all of the section 2-207 cases and in all of the
credit card cases, there is performance by both parties; both regard
a contract as having been formed. The question before the court is
not whether there is a contract, not whether the parties are bound
to the principal obligation, but whether some additional term has
been added to the contract or whether some term of the original
contract or offer has been changed."
In most of the cases considered in this paper, the parties would
acknowledge the existence of a contract of some sort but would
argue over its terms. Put another way, the licensee would argue that
he has a right to make copies or to reverse engineer; far from
denying a contract, he will claim that a contract was made by his
payment of money and his taking possession of a disk that
contained the software. The distinction between cases in which the
parties dispute whether any contract has been made and the cases in
which they concede the existence of a contract but argue for
different terms may be important because the inferences that the
offeror should be permitted to draw about the offeree's probability
of acceptance might be different in the two cases. So what behavior
should we demand from an offeror and an offeree to conclude not
merely that a contract has been made, but to reach the additional
conclusion that the terms of the offer are the terms of that contract?
A. The Contract Purists
Conventional contract doctrine makes it hard for an offeror to
achieve a contract with an offeree who is not explicit in his verbal
23. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (section 2-207 cases); note 7 and
accompanying text (credit card cases).
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or nonverbal behavior. For example, section 2 of the Restatement
Second of Contracts describes a promise as "a manifestation of
intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made
as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has
been made."24 To describe the private act of a licensee as a
"promise" within that definition is a stretch. The act of ripping
open the power cord or clicking "I agree" on a computer screen is
a private act, an act not disclosed to the promisor or to any other
third party. Moreover, the act might not be done by the licensee
but by a third person, a shabbos goy, who is specifically not
authorized to accept.
Section 69 of the Restatement is also slow to infer acceptance
from such behavior. Comment "a" to that section is titled
"Acceptance By Silence Is Exceptional."' The three exceptions
specified in section 69(1) are narrow, only the first comes close to
our case. It finds silence to be acceptance when "an offeree takes the
benefit of offered services with reasonable opportunity to reject
them and reason to know that they were offered with the
expectation of compensation."26 Of course any buyer of a Gateway
computer with Windows installed knows he must pay; in fact, our
offeree has already paid by a credit card authorization. One
response to Microsoft's claim under section 69(1)(a) is that it is
inapplicable. Noting that he has already paid in full for the
hardware and software, the licensee will argue that a contract was
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981).
25. The text of that comment follows:
Ordinarily, an offeror does not have power to cause the silence of
the offeree to operate as acceptance. ... The usual requirement of
notification is stated in § 54 on acceptance by performance and § 56 on
acceptance by promise. The mere receipt of an unsolicited offer does
not impair the offeree's freedom of action or inaction or impose on him
any duty to speak. The exceptional cases where silence is acceptance fall
into two main classes: those where the offeree silently takes offered
benefits, and those where one party relies on the other party's
manifestation of intention that silence may operate as acceptance ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 cmt. a (1981).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §69(1)(a) (1981).
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formed on payment to Gateway and any later proposal by
Microsoft was an ineffective attempt to modify.
So faced with the question I have posed above, a contract purist
might start (and conclude) by noting that the Restatement places a
heavy burden on a person who would earn the benefits of a
contract. Since the licensor has not borne that burden, he loses. The
purist position has virtues. It minimizes litigation; it forestalls
infection of other contract doctrine. It respects and protects the
individual's autonomy by imposing no legal liability without clear,
affirmative action by the offeree.
It also has a cost. If Microsoft sells one million Windows
licenses each year and if all but a tiny fraction of the licensees are
willing to be bound by the terms of Microsoft's license, it would be
wasteful to force Microsoft to get some explicit electronic, oral, or
written response from every licensee to form a binding contract. By
hypothesis this expense would protect only rights of the small
minority who do not want to be bound by the Microsoft license,
but who do not return the Gateway computer together with the
Microsoft software. So a careful adherence to the Restatement leads
to a result that is probably more expensive than allowing the courts
to draw the inference that Microsoft would like them to draw. On
the other hand, Microsoft is enjoying the benefits of contract
liability even though it did not go through the conventional ritual.
But it is far too late for the purist position. At least since Justice
Holmes,27 Judge Hand," and most of the contract establishment
27. See OLIvER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 309 (1881). Holmes
stated:
The law has nothing to do with the actual state of the parties'
minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it must go by externals, and judge
parties by their conduct.... The true ground of the decision was not
that each party meant a different thing from the other.., but that each
said a different thing. The plaintiff offered one thing, the defendant
expressed his assent to another.
Id
28. See Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287,293 (S.D.N.Y.
1911) ("If, however, it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when
he used the words, intended something else than the usual meaning which the
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came out four square for the objectivist approach29 around the turn
of the 20th century, every American contracting party has been
open to the possibility that he will be bound to a contract that he
does not subjectively intend when he has given objective
appearances of agreement." Recall Judge Hand's famous statement
that he would find a contract despite the assurance of twenty
bishops that the party had not intended a contract where the party
had performed the objective ritual showing agreement (and vice
versa). 1 Both the Restatement 32 and the commentators33 have
followed Holmes and Hand, though somewhat more cautiously.
Having departed the certainty of the subjective interpretation
of contract, we are left with no obvious stopping point. We cannot
insist that courts be foreclosed from using a contracting party's
ambiguous verbal and nonverbal behavior to draw inferences about
the existence of a contract or about its terms. The Restatement and
the case law of every state include examples where courts do and
should accept autistic behavior of offerees as sufficient to bind the
offerees. The question is where to stop on this journey from
unequivocal verbal agreement to words or acts that are only
privately done and only faintly representative of an intention to be
bound.
law imposes upon them, he would still be held, unless there were some mutual
mistake, or something else of the sort."), affla 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), ard,
231 U.S. 50 (1913).
29. See, e.g., 2 WIL!STON & LORD, supra note 11, S 6:3 ("[A] manifestation
of apparent intention to accept is necessary, and no informal contract can be
made without it."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1981).
30. But note that some still argue for the use of subjective rather than
objective intent. See, e.g., Michael Ansaldi, The Do-Nothing Offeree: Some
Comparative Reflections, 1 J. TRANSNAT'LL. & POL'Y 43, 51 (1992) ("The will,
actual, subjective and inaccessible, should be central to our thinking about
contract; outer manifestations are only the will's epiphenomena.").
31. See supra note 28.
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 (1981).
33. See Ansaldi, supra note 30.
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B. The Economists
In recent years the lawyer economists have brought new
thinking to the discussion of contract rituals.34 It is commonplace
that certain transaction costs are associated with some kinds of
contracting but not with others. For example, Microsoft might
argue that requiring it to form a written contract with each licensee
would be needlessly expensive and inefficient.
The economists make more subtle efficiency arguments too.
Professor Katz has shown 35 that a clever offeror, using silence as
acceptance, might lure his offeree into an inefficient contract that
is nevertheless profitable for the offeror. Indeed, economic
revisionists might argue that the state and federal statutes that make
unordered merchandise into "gifts" from the offeror were written
with the invisible aid of the law and economics scholar to forestall
inefficiency. When a commodity with limited value, like a book,
arrives unordered and unannounced but with a bill for $30 that
must be paid if the merchandise is not returned (at a cost to the
offeree of $10), it is plausible that a smart offeror (who has done
some market research, and so suspects that the offeree will be
interested in the book) can either lure the offeree into an inefficient
contract or, at worst, capture more of the surplus from the
transaction than he could otherwise get.
Consider first the possibility that the offeror could lure the
offeree into an inefficient contract. Assume the offeree values a
particular computer and its conventional software at $2,000.
Assume the cost of rejecting an offer made by a seller's shipping the
computer with software installed is $30. If the computer arrives on
the offeree's doorstep as part of an offer to sell for $2,025, a rational
buyer will accept by silence (in accordance with the offer) because
rejecting costs $30 and leaves the offeree even worse off
economically than if he grits his teeth and keeps the computer. If,
in the case posed, the offeror's profit is less than $25, we have an
34. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 5.
35. See id at 256-65.
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inefficient contract, albeit one that makes the offeror more
wealthy 6
Contracts such as the one described exist mostly in professors'
minds. To force the offeree to buy for more than his reservation
price (here $2,000), first the offeror must aim carefully; he has to hit
within the range of the rejection cost, but above the offeree's
reservation price. Since the reservation price will be unknown to
the offeror and since the cost of rejection will often be quite small,
the offeror has to be a crack shot to hit that mark.
Even where the contract is efficient, the same process may
enable the offeror to grab more of the surplus than he could in an
interactive contract. Assume for example that the offeree's cost of
rejection is $30 and his only options are to reject or to accept by
inaction once the computer and software arrive. Assume the
offeree's reservation price with the license restrictions is $1,995 and
that the offeror makes an offer of $1,980 with restrictions. Unless
he is confident that the offeror's reservation price is less than $1,950
(the offer less $30), he will accept. In an interactive exchange where
the cost of making a counteroffer is zero, the offeree could make
several counteroffers without fear of losing the bird in the hand (the
offer of $1,980) and without a new and possibly wasted outlay of
$30.37
One should divide the question of efficiency from the related
question of strategic behavior to capture a large share of the wealth
created by the transaction. To prefer one contract ritual over
36. If one disregards transaction costs as apart of the "cost," the contract is
not efficient in a Pareto sense regardless of whether the offeror makes more than
$25, but is inefficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense only if the offeror makes less.
Because Pareto efficiency requires that there be no way to make one party better
without making the other one worse, the offeror's profit amount is irrelevant.
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency exists when a party can make itself better to the
detriment of another only if the amount improved is greater than the amount
the other party loses. Thus, the profit margin of the offeror must be greater than
$25 for this contract to be efficient.
37. Of course, the offeror could try the same ploy (a take it or leave it offer)
in a face to face transaction, but there at least he could be tested for nothing by
the offeree's counter-offer.
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another because it is more efficient conforms to the standard
economic norm that more wealth is better than less. To prefer one
ritual over another because it allocates more of the surplus to a
particular party does not conform to that norm. That preference
requires a separate justification.
If it were found that a new ritual in most circumstances would
enable the offeror to reduce the absolute amount of the surplus that
goes to the offeree by comparison with the amount that would go
to him in an interactive contract, should that be enough to reject
the ritual? Assume, for example, that in a face to face sale of a
computer with Windows '98 the offeree pays $1,925 but under the
new ritual he will pay $1,935. Assume too that the new and the old
sales are Pareto optimal exchanges and that the latter ritual is $5 less
expensive than the former. Thus the change from one ritual to the
other is itself efficient only by the Kaldor-Hicks standard; the
adoption of the new ritual is itself not Pareto optimal since the
offeree's wealth is decreased compared to his status if the
transaction had followed the former ritual.
I see at least two arguments that could be made to justify a
requirement that the offeree not be disadvantaged by the new ritual
compared with the old one. First, one could defend this outcome
by a conventional claim for consumer protection-as single shot
players in a game repeatedly played by their sophisticated offeror
(who is manipulating the game to his benefit), consumer buyers and
licensees need help. Second, one might regard this condition as the
offeror's payment for a change in the law that enables an efficiency
that the offeror seeks and whose benefit it will enjoy. After all, it
is the offeror who asks the legislature or the courts for a change in
the law, and it does not seem unfair to insist that the change be
Pareto optimal, i.e., that it be unequivocally "fair" to the offeree. I
suspect that these "two" arguments are really one-the law should
protect the weak.
Of course, the ability of the offeror to induce an inefficient
contract or to grab surplus through autistic contracts is usually
limited by the information that the offeree acquires at the
beginning of the transaction. Unlike the silence as acceptance cases
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where the entire deal lands unannounced on the offeree's doorstep,
here the contract comes in parts. The offeree almost always knows
of the important terms of the contract before he is made to do an
autistic acceptance of other terms. So the offeree usually has an
inexpensive power of rejection if he acts before delivery. For
example, in the Gateway case the offeree has learned of, and
perhaps even bargained over, the price and specifications before he
has given up his credit card number. Gateway and Microsoft
increase the cost to the offeree only by adding unexpected terms to
the license. The cost of those terms to the offeree cannot exceed the
cost the offeree would incur to reject the offer, or else the offeree
would reject. If the cost of those terms to the licensee (i.e., the
amount he would pay to be free of them) is trivial, the chance of an
inefficient contract or of the offeror's successful manipulation of
the process to seize the surplus is inconsequential.3 8
One would also predict that offerees would eventually adapt to
autistic contracting behavior. Once it became known to offerees
that undesirable terms would follow the discussion of price and
specifications, one would expect some offerees to adjust their
reservation prices or to demand a copy of the terms before the
goods are delivered.
Of course, particular contract rituals bring their own
transaction costs. For example, if autistic contracting caused more
38. Is it possible that Microsoft, Dell, and Micro Electronics have lured some
buyers into inefficient deals? These users buy computers preloaded with
Windows 95/98 or Windows NT, but prefer to use free operating systems such
as Linux, and argue that they are entitled to a refund under their end-user
licensing agreement because they do not use the Microsoft programs. Microsoft
contends that users need to petition the computer manufacturers who sell
computers with Windows pre-installed. The Manufacturers will not give refunds
for Windows alone, although users can return their entire systems within thirty
days of purchase. On February 16, 1999, computer users gathered at Microsoft
offices throughout the country in a "Windows Refund Day" to protest this
situation. Newspaper reports indicate that they did not receive a refund. See
Benny Evangelista, They Don'tDo indows, SANFRANCISCO CHRON., Feb. 16,
1999, at D1; Amy Harmon, Protests HeldAgainst Windows System, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 1999, at C6.
2000] 1717
HeinOnline  -- 45 Wayne L. Rev. 1717 1999-2000
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1693
rejections than would happen under interactive contracting rituals
and, particularly, if those rejections were much more expensive
(because they came after delivery of goods), that would be a
transaction cost that should be charged to this particular ritual.
More often conventional rituals carry higher transaction costs than
autistic ones. Assume the law refuses to recognize a license with
Microsoft after the Gateway autistic exchange. Assume also that for
all but a trivial number of offerees, the restrictive terms in the box
are unimportant. These offerees would pay nothing to avoid the
terms, but the terms are worth $5 to Microsoft. Assume further
that it would cost the offeror an additional $2 per transaction to
abandon its autistic ritual and to deal in the least expensive
interactive way with the offerees. Ignoring the tiny fraction who
are offended by the terms, the $2 cost of contracting is now a dead
weight loss. With these assumptions we have required an expensive
ritual to produce the result that could have been achieved without
the $2 expenditure.39
To estimate the probable cost of permitting contracts to be
made by an autistic acceptance one needs to make guesses about
some of the variables. Of course it is unlikely that the best
alternative mode of interactive contracting would cost $2 per
transaction, but requiring an interactive communication by
telephone, electronically, or through the mail has measurable and
significant costs if the transactions are numerous and if each
transaction has only modest value. So one must estimate both the
number of transactions and the offeror's gain per transaction.
Second, one would want to estimate the proportion of offerees
for whom the restrictions would be costly. The costs to the offeree
of conventional restrictions on the use of software (no copying, no
reverse engineering) are probably close to zero-at least in the case
of mass marketed, canned programs like Windows. Why? For one
thing, the buyer is not a computer engineer and could not reverse
engineer a new variant even if his life depended on it. For another,
39. This proposition still ignores the small fraction of offerees for whom the
terms are costly.
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he surely understands he can safely disregard the contract
prohibition on copying, at least if he is going to copy the program
only once or twice for a friend or family member. Third, one
would want to estimate the cost of rejecting the autistic contract.
This is a limit on the allocative inefficiency that could result from
autistic contracting. If the rare offerees for whom the restrictions
are costly can reject at modest cost, the cost to them will not be
large.
The costs may be different in the business cases involving goods.
As I suggest below, the considerable effort devoted to manipulation
of the form contracting process and the substantial number of cases
involving section 2-207 tell me that business people place a value on
getting their own remedy terms, or at the least, on keeping the
other party from getting all of its terms.4° Because the contracting
transactions are fewer and the dollars per transaction are larger, the
aggregate cost of more expensive traditional contract rituals are less
consequential here too.
To calculate the probable efficiency gain or loss from a new
ritual, one might use a formula that compares (1) efficiency gains
per transaction to the offeror multiplied by the number of expected
transactions, to (2) the rejection cost per transaction to the offeree
multiplied by the number of probable rejections plus the losses
from inefficient contracts without rejection. To be efficient
therefore, one would have to find the following:
40. See, e.g., Altronics of Bethlehem, Inc. v. Repco, Inc., 957 F.2d 1102, 1108
(3d Cir. 1992) (stating that limitation of remedy to repair or replace is material
alteration under section 2-207(2)); Coastal Indus., Inc. v. Automatic Steam Prods.
Corp., 654 F.2d 375, 378-79 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that insertion of choice of
law clause did not materially alter the contract); Salt River Project Agric.
Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 694 P.2d 267, 274
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that section 2-207 did not apply to forms
apparently drafted in order to win the battle of the forms), modified, 694 P.2d
198 (Ariz. 1984). See also Murray, supra note 19, at 1308, 1315-16 (discussing the
regular use of printed forms and subsequent litigation despite the fact of judicial
confusion in application of section 2-207).
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(gain per trans. to offeror) X (no. of trans.) > (rejection cost
per trans.) X (no. of rejections) + (cost of inefficient
contracts performed).
If my hypotheses are correct about the typical software
transaction-transactions with a large number of offerors and a
modest number of rejections-the autistic ritual will usually result
in an efficiency gain. Where there is a large number of transactions,
only a few rejections, and even fewer inefficient acceptances, any
reduction in the cost of the contracting ritual is likely to be efficient
because the gain per transaction on the left side is multiplied by
every single transaction, whereas the offeree's cost is multiplied
only by the few where there is rejection or inefficient acceptance.
One might also insist that the offeree's surplus from the autistic
ritual exceeded the surplus it would have achieved from the
previous ritual- insisting the change be not merely efficient by the
Kaldor-Hicks test but by the Pareto test as well. Whether one
insists upon the latter condition depends upon his concern about
the need of the offeree for protection. Some would argue, and I
might agree, that the market or the self-interest of the offeror
would take care of that problem and would insure the change in the
contract ritual would not disadvantage the offeree by comparison
with the previous ritual.
If my speculation about the interest and cost of the various
contracting alternatives is correct, this suggests that the law should
be comparatively respectful of a mass market software maker's
attempt to make autistic contracts but more suspicious of similar
attempts in the business sales of goods. In the mass market sale of
goods to consumers, consumer advocates would surely sacrifice
efficiency for greater consumer protection. On the wisdom of that
position I am skeptical, but agnostic.
The business sale of goods or unique software might be different
from the mass market of software for two reasons. In the first place,
the efficiency gains will be the greatest in cases where there are
many transactions and an increment of savings is earned with each;
in the mass market there is a new contract with almost every unit
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sold or licensed, but in business sales, one contract might cover
thousands or millions of units. Secondly, as I suggest below, the
business buyers' resistance to form disclaimers and limitations of
remedy that is revealed by decisions under section 2-207 suggests
that the offeree's cost per transaction of disclaimers and limitations
of liability may be greater than the cost of conventional restrictions
on licenses that are contained in software agreements.
C Proposal
Under what circumstances should the law. confer the legal rights
of a contract on an offeror who has not performed a traditional
contract ritual? Which contracts that are concluded by an autistic
acceptance should be treated as containing the offeror's terms? As
I suggest above, I do not believe that the law can or should deny
effect to every act that was not subjectively intended by the actor
to be an acceptance. Objective manifestations are the norm, and
rightly so.
At minimum, it seems to me that the very idea of contracting
carries with it one condition: that the offeree not be bound to the
contract until and unless the offeree has had a reasonable
opportunity to learn of the offeror's terms. Even if the terms
contained in the Gateway box were reasonable and would be
acceptable to almost all offerees, the law should not bind any
individual offeree until that offeree has had the opportunity to open
the box and read the terms-unless of course the terms have been
made available to him earlier. The licensors in ProCD and Gateway
granted the offeree a right to return the goods and cancel the license
once the offeree had learned of the terms. Section 211 in UCITA
imposes that same requirement in mass-market licenses. Irrespective
of the efficiency argument, I believe the law should insist that a
reasonably diligent offeree at least be able to find the terms before
he is bound.
Beyond that condition, I am drawn to the idea that the law
should validate almost any new autistic ritual that is more efficient
than the old.
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But I still have a few doubts. It seems wrong for our contract
law to indorse any autistic ritual that is likely to leave many weaker
and less sophisticated parties worse off than they were under the
prior ritual. Clearly the law should not permit a new ritual that is
likely to enable the offerors to make favorable but inefficient
contracts. For the reasons I have discussed above and for others as
well, it seems unlikely that any new ritual will produce a significant
number of inefficient contracts where the offeror entices the offeree
into a contract that not only diminishes the offeree's share of the
surplus, but does so by an amount that exceeds the increase in the
offeror's wealth from the transaction.
It is possible-although unlikely-that the offeror could exercise
its strategic advantage under an autistic ritual in a way that
produces a more efficient outcome than under the old ritual but
would still leave the offeree worse off. This is Professor Katz's
hypothesis that strategic behavior by the offeror might enable the
offeror to actually reduce the amount of the surplus that goes to the
offeree in the new ritual by comparison to the old.41 This too seems
unlikely for several reasons. First, our baseline is a deal for the
identical commodity under a prior ritual. That ritual produced a
price dictated by market factors that may also dictate the new price.
For reasons I discuss above (particularly that the price and
specifications are known at the outset of the transaction and before
the offeree is committed), the strategic benefits associated with most
autistic acceptances are small. Also, buyers who are repeat players
will be educated by their past experiences and that education
diminishes the possibility of strategic behavior by the offerors.
So I favor a rule that would recognize autistic contracts in
almost all cases where the change from the old ritual to the new is
likely to be Pareto optimal. If the offerees are no worse off under
the new ritual and the offerors are better off, wealth is created and
society at large benefits even if there are no immediate benefits to
the offerees. Conversely, the courts should reject the new ritual
where the change is not efficient even by the Kaldor-Hicks test.
41. See Katz, supra note 5, at 256-65.
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Where the change is efficient by Kaldor-Iicks but not by
Pareto (the offerees are worse off under the autistic ritual than
under the old ritual), I am uncertain. Perhaps these cases do not
exist. Understand that I am hypothesizing a case in which the
offeror not only takes the entire surplus that results from the
efficiency of the new ritual but takes even more and leaves the
offeree worse off than he was before. In a competitive market this
should not be possible; some of the participants should choose to
share the surplus and so increase their percentage of the market.
Even in a noncompetitive market one would not expect that an
offeror would choose to raise its price simply because it was
incidentally enjoying an unrelated efficiency. Even a monopolistic
offeror sets its price at a particular level for some reason (keeping
potential competitors at bay, facilitating sales of peripheral products
for which there is competition, maximizing its return by the
appropriate trade-off between volume and price). Unless that reason
changes, one would expect that a monopolist would leave its price
unchanged even though it might take the entire surplus.
If I am wrong, and if the offeror successfully manipulates the
new ritual to increase the offeree's price, we should probably turn
to other policies to determine whether we recognize the autistic
ritual here. If these cases exist, they are probably not in the business
context and are likely to be contracts entered into by
unsophisticated and comparatively ignorant consumers. Perhaps
they deserve the protection of the law.
Ignoring the last cases (where the new ritual might be more
efficient but where the offeree will be worse off), how does one
distinguish the case where the autistic ritual is more efficient than
the traditional one? How can a court tell one from the other and so
validate one contract and invalidate the other? Is it to hear
testimony from economic and behavioral experts on efficiency and
probable behavior of hypothetical offerors and offerees? Should we
ask the courts and legislatures to make ad hoc and instinctive
guesses, as some courts seem to have done? For example, in ProCD,
Judge Easterbrook emphasized that the offeror gave the offeree a
thirty day return right and intimates that the case might have been
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different if it had not done so.42 This is as close as the courts have
come to measuring the efficiency of a ritual (i.e., does the thirty day
right reduce the cost of rejection sufficiently to render the offeror's
gains greater than the offeree's costs?). Perhaps we could ask the
courts to look for proxies for efficiency. Is the cost of rejection
high? Are the belatedly revealed terms or conditions costly for the
usual offeree? Would the offeree likely have accepted these terms in
a face to face transaction so we can at least conclude the sale is
Pareto optimal-even if the change from one ritual to another may
not be?43 At minimum we could do what UCITA will do, namely,
mandate a right to return.
Consider four cases:
1. Buyer calls Gateway to purchase a computer. The parties
make an agreement for purchase of the computer without
mentioning software and the buyer pays for the computer by giving
Gateway the authorization to draw on his credit card. When the
computer arrives, the box contains Windows '98 with conditions
that restrict copying, reverse engineering, and resale.
The buyer reverse engineers a competing program and
Microsoft sues to enjoin sale or other use of the reverse engineered
program. Assume that Microsoft makes no claim under the
copyright law, it relies only on its contract rights to prohibit the
licensee from reverse engineering. What result?
2. Individual taxpayer orders Turbo Tax '98 from Intuit. She
pays Intuit by giving them a credit card number. In two weeks a
disk containing the Turbo Tax program arrives. When consumer
loads the program she finds it will not operate unless she clicks on
42. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996).
43. Apart from the considerable uncertainty of inviting the courts into the
economist's apothecary, there is at least one other confession that I should make.
To determine whether each change in contract ritual-from conventional to
autistic-is efficient, I have assumed that one would compare the practice that
prevails in a particular setting with the newly proposed ritual. That means of
course that different offerors will have different points of comparison. For
example, an industrial offeror now often deals with its offeree by the battle of
the forms under section 2-207, but a consumer buyer or licensee deals in a
telephone interactive transaction.
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an "I agree" box which is associated with certain conditions of the
Intuit license. Among these is a prohibition on copying the
program even once. Consumer copies the program twice and gives
a disk to each of two friends. Somehow learning of this and wishing
to make her an example, Intuit sues for damages. Intuit does not
depend upon copyright protection, it sues only on the contract.
What outcome?
3. A representative of Lear Seating negotiates with a purchasing
manager at Daimler Chrysler. Without reaching a final agreement
but with the tentative understanding that they are going ahead with
the transaction, Lear sends an "offer to sell" to Daimler Chrysler.
The "offer to sell" states that a contract will be formed on the terms
specified in the seller's form if Daimler Chrysler does any of the
following acts: (a) issues its own purchase order number, (b)
otherwise processes the Lear order or, (c) commences any
performance under the order.
Daimler Chrysler later sends back its own document, labeled an
"offer to buy." This document requires certain warranties from
Lear and explicitly objects to any disclaimers or limitations of
remedy that appear in Lear's document. The seats are defective and
Daimler Chrysler sues Lear. Lear defends on the ground that its
document, the offer, became the contract when Daimler Chrysler
issued a purchase order number even before an actual purchase
order was delivered. What are the terms of the contract?
4. Clark Equipment Company manufactures mining equipment.
It sells the equipment through distributors and does not have direct
contact with any of the end users. The user buys from and contracts
only with a local distributor. Concerned about the economic loss
claims that have been made on breach of warranty and contract
theories, Clark commences attaching documents to the equipment
itself. The documents specify that the Clark Equipment Company
makes an express warranty of "no manufacturing defects" and limits
its duty to the repair and replacement of any goods that, within
three years, prove to be defectively made. These documents state
that the buyer's commencement of use of the machinery constitutes
acceptance of Clark's offer and will bind the user to Clark's terms.
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What are the terms of the contract with a buyer?
How should each of these cases be resolved?
Consider first the Microsoft Windows '98 package with the
Gateway computer. Is the new ritual more efficient than a
conventional ritual here? Because Windows '98 is a canned program
marketed to a large business and consumer market, it seems
plausible that one would expect the licensor of such a product to
protect itself by conventional restrictions. Recognizing that some
people in the computer industry believe that reverse engineering is
an important part of the rights of users-at least of programs that
are not mass marketed-I still would expect prohibitions on
copying and reverse engineering. So, few are likely to reject on
learning of these conditions on the license.
But isn't the cost of rejection here large? To reject, the offeree
would somehow have to get his money back from Gateway, money
that goes partly into the pocket of Microsoft for the program and
partly to Gateway for the hardware. He would have to package the
computer and send it back-unless he could find another suitable
operating system to work on the particular computer he had
purchased. He might then have to wait without another computer
for an indefinite period if he did not have enough money to buy a
computer before he got his refund. Moreover, the buyer would be
confronted with the same temptation that confronts the person
who receives "free goods"; the clever offeror has imposed a
considerable cost.
The cost is not as high as it seems; recall how this contract was
made. In this case the bargain over the important terms between the
offeror and the offeree occurred during the telephone conversation
when the buyer was discussing price and specifications of his
computer with the Gateway representative. At that point, the
offeree's cost of rejection was trivial. Merely by terminating the
conversation he could reject any offer and then turn to a local
computer store or to another direct seller. If we assume, as I have
suggested above, that for all but a tiny fraction of the Gateway
buyers, the restrictions that are disclosed only with the computer
are inconsequential, the cost of rejection is correspondingly low
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because by hypothesis the rejection will occur during the original
part of the bargain, not after delivery.
What is the gain from avoiding a more elaborate contracting
ritual? Presumably thousands or perhaps even millions of copies of
Windows are sold each year. To require the offeror to procure a
written or oral affirmation of the terms of the contract from each
offeree would be expensive. For example, to make the deal (and to
deliver the software) over the Internet would present other and,
perhaps more difficult problems. First, at least a "pre"-Windows '98
program would have to be loaded on the computer so that the
computer could make an Internet connection with Microsoft.
Exactly how complicated it is to make such a program available for
new buyers on the net and how much time it would take to
download the program over the Internet is beyond me. It is
conceivable that the time and effort would be considerably greater
than putting the program on a disk and sending it with the
computer or sending the computer with Windows already installed.
Of course there are many other contracting alternatives that
Microsoft might consider. It might include a postcard for the
licensee to sign and return. It might require Gateway to inform the
licensee of the terms or their presence. It could also make Gateway
its agent for contracting.
I favor the offeror here. It seems quite likely that the offeror
could reasonably believe that almost all offerees would agree to
terms that restrict copying and reverse engineering. It is also
plausible that the available contracting alternatives (given
widespread use of Windows and the difficulty of on-line
downloads) might be costly.
Still, the offeree's burden of rejection after his receipt of the
goods and license are monumental. Then we are asking the licensee,
who, like a dog presented with his meal, has commenced to salivate,
to send the program and, probably, the computer back to Gateway.
The licensee must do that with the hope, but not the certainty, that
he will eventually get a credit on his credit card. But I think this
costly rejection is the rare exception, not the norm. Since the
important terms in this contract for almost all licensees are almost
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always those disclosed during the phone conversation, the true cost
of rejection is usually trivial. Spread over the body of purchaser
offerees those costs seem insignificant.
The second case, Intuit's requirement of a private "I agree," is
easier. An interactive "I agree" communicated to the offeror would
clearly satisfy conventional contract doctrine and would cause a
contract to be formed. But here we consider a private ritual. The
offeree is not on-line with the offeror, she is in her study. On the
first loading of Turbo Tax she is called upon to say to herself, "I
agree," to bow three times to the east. I overlook the complications
that might arise if someone other than the buyer loaded the
program, if a particularly clever licensee loaded the program
without clicking on the "I agree" box, or if the licensee
simultaneously shouted out "I do not agree" as she was pushing the
"I agree" key.)' Because clicking on the "I agree" box is a condition
to making the program operate, the ritual the offeree is made to
perform is not quite the same as the private statement "I agree," it
is a conscious act with known consequences that must be
performed in order to make the program work. Thus it is more like
ripping open the marked plastic to get at the power cord, an act
that almost always must be done in order to have the program
work.
Surely the buyer of Turbo Tax knows that Intuit makes money
by selling these and expects that it is a violation of her contract
with Intuit to make copies and provide them to others who are
potential purchasers of the product.4'
The burden of rejection after receipt here is much lower than
in the Gateway case. While the taxpayer might be sitting down on
April 14 to do her taxes and only then discover the offensive term,
that would be an unusual taxpayer. Most taxpayers could easily
reject the program, return the disk, and procure competing tax
preparation software. If, as in Gateway, the important terms are
44. See supra notes 24 and 30 and accompanying text.
45. See UCITA § 112(d), supra note 1 (explaining that proof of conduct
equals "I agree").
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known at the time of the telephone order, the costs of rejection are
yet further reduced. So it seems to me that the burden of rejection
is not significant in this case. It is particularly insignificant given the
fact that a potential licensee bargained directly with Intuit for the
purchase of this program. Unlike the Gateway case, where the
licensee could plausibly argue that he did not believe he was going
to have to make a separate contract with Microsoft, the taxpayer is
buying software from Intuit, and only software.
Are there alternatives available that are not significantly more
expensive for Intuit? It could train its sales staff to get the licensees'
an oral or electronic agreement, for in this case the licensee is not
dealing with a third party but directly with the offeror.
Presumably, Intuit could train its sales personnel to say at the
conclusion of the deal: "You know, of course, that there are
conditions to which you will have to agree in order to operate the
software. If you do not agree to those you must send the software
back to us; we will pay the shipping." Intuit could include a similar
statement in its on-line offer for those who buy over the Internet.
It is also possible that the software could be downloaded over the
web concurrently with a payment and without the requirement of
sending a disk. I am ignorant of the technical and practical
problems of procuring the software by Internet, not by disk.
I believe we should recognize this contract. The new ritual here
is doubtlessly more efficient than the alternatives. Because of the
expectations of the offeree, few rejections are likely, and for the few
rejections that do occur, the cost will be small if the product is
widely sold. There will be substantial savings in not having to
require the offeree to send a card, make a phone call, or engage in
a long interactive exchange.
What about Lear and Daimler Chrysler? Lear, sending what
purports to be an offer, hopes to get its terms. The commercial
trade practice hurts Lear's claim. Lear, a member of the automobile
business, understands that Daimler Chrysler deals with suppliers by
purchase orders, acknowledgments, and the like. It expects to
receive the document it will ultimately receive from Daimler
Chrysler, namely a responsive document that purports to state the
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exclusive terms of the deal. Lear has no reasonable expectation that
Daimler Chrysler would accept its terms in a face to face
transaction. It expects a conflicting response from Daimler
Chrysler, one that says "mine" and "not yours." The burden of
rejection is not high for Daimler Chrysler but there may be
alternative modes of contracting that will procure a more reliable
agreement. If, as likely, this contract involves millions of dollars of
goods, the cost of negotiating a conventional contract might be
trivial. Even if one did not negotiate a contract, the cost of
contracting by complying with the traditional ritual-namely that
provided in section 2-207-is not significantly more expensive than
the one attempted by Lear. The behavior of commercial parties
sending purchase orders and acknowledgments, behavior that
produces most of the litigation under section 2-207, tells me that the
cost to an offeree of taking the offeror's terms on rejection,
revocation, arbitration, warranty disclaimers, limitation of
liabilities, and other remedies is substantial. Moreover, the fact that
a single commercial contract might cover sales of thousands, even
millions of pieces tells me that the cost to the offeree is likely to be
large by comparison with the modest savings to the offeror. Savings
here are modest not because the offeror does not place a great value
on limiting its liability, but because the number of transactions is
smaller. Here a single contract could cover years of purchases. For
sellers or licensors to individual consumers, there is a separate
contract and thus an incremental gain with each item or license
sold. It seems likely that Lear could not show that a new ritual
would be more efficient than the existing section 2-207 ritual.
Last is Clark Equipment Company. If we adopt a rule that lets
Microsoft get what it wants by an autistic web contract, should we
also solve manufacturers' long standing difficulties in procuring
agreements from remote users of their products? I think not. This
case is like Daimler Chrysler's. Because the number of transactions
will be comparatively small, the cost of using a more expensive
ritual will be trivial, yet the cost of rejecting a $400,000 machine
might be enormous. If, moreover, we assume that the offeree would
object to the offeror's limitations of liability and would regard
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them as significantly reducing the value of the transaction, the
autistic ritual is probably less efficient than the traditional
alternative.
IV. CONCLUSION
Where does my proposal leave us? It says that many autistic
contracts should be recognized, for in many cases, the reduction in
transaction costs made possible by an autistic ritual will easily
outweigh the costs imposed on dissenting offerees. This is
particularly true where there are many contracts (and so much
savings). On the other hand, where a single contract controls a large
quantity of goods or services, an autistic ritual is unlikely to be
more efficient and so should be questioned. In most cases the law
should insist that the offeree not be bound to an autistic contract
until he has had a reasonable opportunity to know the terms
offered. Thus, if Gateway did not offer an opportunity either to
know the terms before delivery or to return the goods after one had
opened the box and seen the terms of the license, we should decline
to recognize terms in the box-at least where they make any
material change. This is a fair price for the benefits of having a
contract.
I appreciate, of course, that reasonable people could differ about
the outcomes in my hypotheticals, and I do not claim that my
proposal will give bright lines. Where a transaction will surely
create wealth and where doing it other ways might substantially
diminish that wealth, my proposal holds out the hope, if not the
promise, of offerors' achieving their ends in many cases where they
receive only autistic responses.
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